Pre-hearing compulsory Appropriate Dispute Resolution processes (ADR) is increasingly popular in the Australian judicial system, with expectations of achieving fair, quick and efficient resolution of disputes and a reduction in the number of lengthy expensive court based proceedings. While new jurisdictions are enthusiastically incorporating compulsory pre-hearing ADR there is little research on longstanding institutions. The private nature of these court annexed ADR processes can be an inherent weakness; allowing less rigorous use of ADR processes to go unchecked and potentially lessening achievement of substantive justice for individual appellants.
Introduction
This paper addresses the problem of variability in statutory Appropriate Dispute Resolution processes (ADR) processes by exploring factors influencing the achievement of substantive justice, fairness, for appellants. Fairness is the corner stone of all justice processes, whether formal adversarial processes traditionally associated with western court systems or emerging alternative processes such as mediation and conciliation. Importantly, neurobiology reveals spontaneous changes in the brain in response to the experience of unfairness. We cannot avoid people's reaction to unfairness, but we can better understand reactions and work to reduce unfairness and its impact.
Using a case study approach this paper draws from the author's experience and insights as an ADR practitioner conducting over 1,000 WorkCover statutory conciliations between injured workers and insurers about entitlements to compensation. Data is obtained from publically available Annual General Reports is presented in time series graphs and trends are analysed. Key areas identified as impacting on outcomes include resolution rates, the limited influence Conciliators have over repeat players' behaviours, changes in management priorities and work intensification. These findings raise questions about assessment criteria and start to challenge the assumptions implicit in selecting 'satisfaction' as the critical criteria measuring success of statutory ADR processes.
Context
In the Australian state of Victoria at least 73 separate pieces of legislation refer to ADR (Arthur, 2014) . The Civil Procedure Act 2010 Vic introduced a number of themes and objects that aimed to facilitate the just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute (Sec 1 (1) (1c)). These included proportionality, early settlement of disputes by agreement between the parties, and the efficient conduct of the business of the court. The Civil Procedure Act 2010 makes reference to the extent to which the parties have used reasonable endeavours to resolve the dispute and the extent to which the parties have had the benefit of legal advice and representation (Sec 9 (2)). It further defines proportionality as minimising delay and dealing with a proceeding in a manner proportionate to the complexity or importance of the issues in dispute and the amount in dispute (Sec 9 (1)) and amply sets the scene for the spread of statutory ADR processes in Victoria.
Although the Civil Procedure Act 2010 sets out these general expectations, ADR processes are referred to only by titles such as mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation, judicial resolution conference, expert determination and arbitration. There is a lack of substantive detail about what these processes actual entail. Conciliation is the statutory ADR process most frequently mandated, and is the focus of this study. In 2003 the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (NADRAC) encouraged greater consistency of ADR terms by providing standardised descriptions of common terms.
Conciliation is described as:
The conciliator may advise on or determine the process…make suggestions for terms of settlement, give expert advice on likely settlement terms and may actively encourage participants to reach agreement. (NADRAC, 2003) This description of conciliation provides only the most general of guidance, leaving much scope for interpretation and little assistance in the selection of process evaluation and assessment criteria.
Additionally, this author has not found evidence based research that explores variations in practise nor evidence based attempts to identify correlations between practise models and outcomes. While there are many claims of popularity, satisfaction and benefits, there is little evidence of how particular models of statutory conciliation are associated with settlement rates (Urwin, 2012).
The Victorian Accident Compensation Conciliation Service (ACCS)
Victoria has a statutory no-blame system of insurance (the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 Victoria (the Act)) for workers who are injured at work. The Act also establishes an independent service (the ACCS) that conciliates disputes between a worker and insurer about entitlements. The Act sets out that Conciliation Officers are independent Governor -in-Council appointments, that is, they are appointed and answerable directly to the Minister and must be persons who can demonstrate the highest level of integrity and impartiality. The Act does not specify any skills or qualifications for these appointments.
Although the majority of matters are superficially a two party dispute, the employer who pays premiums to the selected insurer and the Victorian statutory agency WorkSafe who acts as regulator, are silent partners. In effect the insurer answers to both the employer and the regulator as interested parties. The Act is silent on the actual mechanics of the conciliation process, as was its predecessor, but creates conciliation at ACCS as a mandatory step before the worker can proceed to Court. The Act compels injured workers to take reasonable steps to resolve the dispute at the conciliation stage, but there is no corresponding statutory requirement for the Insurer's Agent. This limits the Conciliation Officer's capacity to influence the behaviour of Insurer's Agents and is particularly concerning in light of the power differentials of the parties. Although Ministerial guidelines establish standards of behaviour for Insurer's Agents, and consequences for serious breaches, in reality these have become ineffective because breaches identified by Conciliation Officers can be dismissed administratively before taking effect.
The Act requires that Conciliation Officers maintain confidentiality regarding the substance of the dispute, but is silent about the parties' requirement to keep confidentiality. In practise this means Insurer's Agents can talk freely about a worker's personal injury matters. Confidentiality is considered a cornerstone of ADR processes as it allows the parties to reveal personal and private matters without fear of being publically exposed. In this arena, only one party has personal and private matters, the other party is a professional representing the insurer. Although the Act states that information revealed in conciliation is privileged, the reality is that A Conciliation Officer must, having regard to the need to be fair, informal, quick and efficient and having regard to the objects of the Act, make all reasonable efforts to conciliate in connection with a dispute and to bring the parties to agreement (WIRC, 2013, Sec. 293) While the Act is silent about the process, successive Annual Reports adhere to the standard process as defined by NADRAC citing conciliation as a process whereby the Conciliation Officer assists the parties to:
• identify the issues relevant to the dispute,
• develop potential resolution options,
• consider alternatives and consequences, and 
Literature Review
Notwithstanding this statutory focus on ADR processes there is little, if any, agreement in practise about what processes are actually used. Bayliss (1999) identified random variation in processes that are unrelated to the characteristics of the dispute. These included whether or not the process was voluntary or mandatory, limits to confidentiality and privilege, the agency's role in enforcing the settlement and whether or not there is a determinative role. There were also marked variations in the prescribed characteristics of the ADR practitioner, regarding the requisite skills, qualifications and the nature of the appointment. Appointments varied from independent roles via a judicial or Governor in Council appointment, to in-house employees or external contractors. Bayliss (1999) also found a wide variation in practise around the giving of advice and guidance on substantive matters.
Despite these variations in practise, it would be bizarre in a statutory context for the conciliator not to comment on the substance of the dispute or not to put forward options for resolution. Similarly, the statutory independence of the ADR practitioners is considered essential to the impartiality and absence of bias required to achieve fairness and justice (Van Gramberg, 2006 ). Power differentials exist in every society, part of the role of a justice process is to ensure that these power differentials do not impact on the delivery of fair outcomes. In 1985 the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity identified that power differentials were impacting on the types of settlement being achieved. The Commissioner found that: the more vulnerable the person, the more likely to experience discrimination and to have fewer resources to combat, this being the case the worker has no alternative but to accept whatever the conciliator is able to negotiate for them.
Privatisation of justice: power differentials and the delivery of fairness
(Commissioner for Equal Opportunity 1985, in Scutt, 1988, 508) Large insurance corporations, who send professional representatives to conciliation, are joined with the employer and to a lesser extent the WorkSafe regulator who keeps a watchful eye on the payments of benefits, with a focus on trends and outliers. On the other side is the individual worker, who may or may not have the support of a Worker's Representative. Ignoring these power differentials can only serve to strengthen the party with the greatest power, in this case the insurer (Scutt, 1988) , with the effect of reducing the prospect of fair outcomes being consistently achieved. Analysis, 2016, Vol. 3, No. 2 http://jmaca.maynoothuniversity.ie Page | 480
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Delivering fairness requires attention to the outcomes not just the process. The ADR profession has emerged in recognition of the limits and potential disadvantages of the adversarial justice processes.
These are legitimate and real concerns. However, this enthusiasm for procedural justice and an informal approach, has been at the expense of attention to fairness of outcomes. Sensitivity to interactional justice has led to an over emphasis on the positive impact of respectful and empathetic interactions with the ADR practitioner (Papgari Sangareddy, 2009) . It is generally accepted that meeting expectations of procedural justice, i.e. consistency, impartially and the right of reply, will positively influences parties'
belief that the outcome is fair irrespective of normative ideas of fairness (Tyler, 1988) . However, neither interactional nor procedural justice is a substitute for substantive fairness (Webster 2010).
Neurobiological research has found that our reactions to fairness, or its lack, are hardwired (Singer, et al, 2006) . More than procedural and interactional justice, parties need and want distributive, otherwise known as substantive, justice.
Our understanding of the delivery of justice via ADR processes needs to take into account power differentials and how they impact on decision-making, and refocus our attention back to achieving fairness.
Methodology
Using a case study approach, a review was conducted of publically available data from a single statutory ADR organisation. Statistics from 10 consecutive ACCS Annual Reports, 2004/5 to 2014/15, were collated and presented as a time series graphs. Stakeholder surveys was also reviewed, however these survey changed significantly in 2014 and 2015 thereby reducing their usefulness in a undertaking a time series study. The analysis was informed by the author's experience as a statutory conciliation at ACCS, conducting over 1,000 conciliations and maintaining a settlement rate of 10% higher than average over a 2½ year period.
A time series comparative analysis was chosen to explore whether or not there were any corelational trends between internal variables. The variables of interest were the resolution rates, time taken to complete matters, ADR staffing levels and the full-time part-time mix. The study included the Conciliation Officers and excluded administrative staffing levels in order to obtain an understanding of the impact, if any, of ADR work rate on resolution rate.
Findings and Analysis
The analysis focuses on the work rate of the Conciliation Officer in relation to the resolution rate. The first time-series graph is of the overall ACCS resolution rates of completed matters. A completed matter is a dispute that has been conciliated and finalised with or without a resolution. Matters not resolution may proceed to Court. There has been a steady decline in the resolution rates, from a high of 71.8% in
Implications
The key aims of statutory ADR as set out in the Act are fairness, informality, quickness and efficiency, and are therefore the measures of the success of the ACCS. This study is interested in fairness in ADR and, while carefully avoiding delving into the nature of fairness, attempts to bring fairness to the forefront of the ADR professional's mind. Historically the ACCS reports on but has not set targets for resolution rates, stating that this is influenced by external factors such as the decision-making of the insurance agent and the attitude of workers to appealing to the Court. However, resolution rates do not necessarily equate with fairness, nor does 'satisfaction', despite being a traditional evaluative measure of ADR processes and outcomes.
Resolution may not be indicative of a worker's satisfaction with the settlement. In my experience workers will frequently be guided by the Conciliator or their Workers Representative and will accept a settlement offer they may not think is fair but consider it is the best they will get without going to Court. A settlement may not be fair. Some workers simply do not know what a reasonable entitlement is in the circumstances. They may be satisfied and the dispute may settle, but an external objective observer may question the fairness of the outcome. Additionally, the relief and pleasure felt when treated with respect and dignity throughout the process, i.e. being afforded interactional justice, will influence a worker's reporting of their satisfaction levels. But clearly, satisfaction with a process or an outcome does not necessarily equal fairness or achieve justice.
The inherent power imbalance of the current system can lead to workers accepting lower settlements than they could be entitled to, and a reluctance to take the matter further. Unexamined assumptions about power can also lead to the conciliator using their skills to persuade the less powerful to accept a lower settlement. This may not seem like coercion, but it is (Scutt, 1988) .
This analysis challenges the view that participant satisfaction is a valid measure of success of a conciliation process.
What then are the criteria by which the ACCS service is to be judged? Surely one must be the standard of conduct and actions of the conciliation process. Dunn (2013) With the current standard of scrutiny, Insurers Agents have incentives to block and resist reasonable proposals and there is no recourse available to Conciliation Officers, while worker's only recourse is the expense and stress of Court. The lack of statutory restraints on the behaviour of the insurers, may limit the opportunity for the weaker party, the worker, to have their issues and concerns given full consideration, leading to less favourable outcomes.
Issues of power-imbalance are real problems, but better understanding their impact on the conciliation process and outcomes can be used to lift standards. Similarly, difficulties related to the evaluation of the conciliation process and its impact on the achievement of fairness is too important to be set aside easily.
Conclusions
This paper has raised questions about the practise of ADR in conciliation, the ability of Conciliation Officers to manage the conduct of repeat players, the motivations of repeat players to make reasonable offers and counter offers, and the impact of power differentials on the weaker party's capacity to reach a fair settlement. The analysis throws light on the increasing intensification of work, already a high stress and high volume environment, for Conciliation Officers. The overall resolution rate is slowly declining, suggesting that this work intensification is somehow impacting on the Conciliation Officer's efforts to bring the parties to agreement. Investigation of the conduct and decision-making of repeat players in statutory conciliation and the effect it has on achieving fairness and settlements is warranted.
As the ADR profession matures, steps to ensure that fairness and justice are upheld in these private arenas can be taken. Properly conducted research and the establishment of standards and criteria that reliably and validly measure fairness are within the professional expertise of the industry. This exploratory study provides some support for embarking on rigorous testing of ADR processes and for deeper analysis of the structural impediments to achieving fairness.
